The EL TORO TRAGEDY
by David Pascoe, Marine Surveyor
Go to
Introduction
PART I
Incident
PART II
Coast Guard analysis
PART III
CG Conclusions of the Investigation
PART IV
Lessons to be Learned: The Surveyor's Role
The story begins when Bob Smith purchased a
fleet of 5 aging wooden party boats in 1989, among these the then 32 year
old "ELTORO". According to Coast Guard interviews, Smith said that he
relied heavily on a 1987 survey performed for the previous owner
(emphasis added), and the fact that the vessels held current
Certificates of Inspection. In other words, Smith said that he was relying
on the Coast Guard to ensure that his vessels were safe. Smith had no
independent surveys of the vessels made on his own behalf. The purchase
was made with no log books or maintenance records being given the buyer,
nor were any kept following the purchase.
Vessel Particulars EL TORO is described as a
58' party boat specifically designed for party fishing and built in
Norfolk, Virginia in 1961. Typical of her type for that era and region,
she has what is known as a "bay bottom," being transversely planked in
1.75" yellow pine on a longitudinal framing system. She has a 16.5' beam,
draws 4.7' and is powered with a single 310 HP Detroit Diesel. Perhaps
most significantly, she was fastened with galvanized cut nails. She is of
a type well known to the region in which she operated.
Coast Guard Inspections The past history
involving the U.S.C.G. program for inspected vessels is interesting from a
number of points. The investigation report delves back in Coast Guard
inspection records an to April 1988 drydock report, but not earlier. The
following direct quotes from the report are considered relevant:
| "26. On 29 mar 1988 Lieutenant Blank
completed routine triennial inspection for certification of the
vessel. He noted in internal reports " minor leakage from stbd chine
between frames 3 & 3 in NR compartment. All satisfactory. No
requirements issued . . ." |
| "27.CW03 Blank completed drydock examination . . . noted in
internal reports that wood around the chine fasteners showed signs of
damage from electron flow . . recommended fastener removal for
specific evaluation at next drydock . . A special 'inspection note'
was entered into the CG nationwide computer MSIS to call the chine
fasteners to attention of future inspections. The note expired on 29
March 1993. |
| "28. On April 4, 1989 LTCDR Blank conducted the annual
reinspection . . . however he noted 'some working of the keel and
water seepage in the mid-portion of fuel tank compartment (stbd side
of keel) I examined transverse keel bolts and drift pins . . .
appeared satisfactory. Recommended these bolts and pins be monitored
at next DD.' No requirements pertaining to hull structure were
issued." |
| "31 Each spring from 1989 to 1992 Mr. Bob Smith has the vessel
drydocked without Coast Guard examination. 33. On 8 March Mr. B Smith
requested extension of the CG drydock examination |
| "34. ON 11 April 1990 BMC Blank conducted the annual inspection .
. . vessel does qualify for D/D extension until April 91. |
| "35. ON 5 December Bob Smith requested . . and extension of D/D
examination due date 'for a five year period", noting the vessel has
been operated and will be operating [between certain points on the
Chesapeake]. LCDR Blank replied in writing that the extension request
was granted . . . due date changed to 14 April, 1993. |
| "37. . . .[U.S.C.G.] local guidance policy and propagated brackish
water category are not addressed in 46 CFR 176.15-1(a) The policy
makes no provision for the age of the vessel." [Emphasis added]/
|
| "40. On 27 April 1992 . . . annual reinspection . . . noted
excessive evidence of stray current or exhaust leakage in the engine
compartment (sic). This was 'angel hair', also informally called
stringy wood but formally called dry rot, and wood around fasteners
turning white from electron flow. No special attention was given to
the 1988 drydock examination notes about pulling fasteners, but a
discussion with LCDR Blank led to a note not recommending drydock
extension . . . [the]decision however was not reversed." |
Events of the Tragedy On December 4, 1993,
the evening TV weather reports indicated predicted winds of 22 to 30 mph
for the Chesapeake Bay. Bob Smith, who would pilot the vessel on the
following mornings voyage, admitted that he had seen these reports. At
3:30 AM on the morning of the 5th, NOAA issued a small craft warning with
predicted winds of 20-25 knots and six foot seas. At 0730 Smith's brother
Carl listened to the VHF weather report and heard the small craft warning.
At that time seas were calm. But it was known that a frontal system was
approaching that would soon change the current conditions.
Note: The report conveniently does not mention wind direction, along
with a great number of other relevant details and evidence that any
surveyor would consider an absolute necessity in an investigation of such
magnitude. One of the prominent features of this report is it's
selective use of evidence and major omissions of evidence of
critical importance. One can easily anticipate that if ever called into
evidence in a trial, the author would not have an easy time of it before a
skilled trial attorney.
At 0800 twenty passengers boarded the EL TORO II to go fishing. The
crew consisted of Bob Smith, his brother Carl, and a 19 year old male
deckhand. Bob Smith held an appropriate Coast Guard issued operators
license and the other two held no licenses.
The vessel cast off at 0815 for the fishing grounds "almost due east of
Smith Point, Virginia and about a half a mile south of the
Maryland/Virginia border where it arrived around 1015. This position is
approximately in the center of the bay. The fetch in any given direction
is ten miles or more, but the report doesn't mention this. At no time were
any of the passengers given any safety instructions or briefing. Remember
that this is in December when the water temperature is indicated as being
50 degrees. It is also of interest that the vessel operators did not keep
any kind of log nor did they create a passenger manifest, meaning that
they did not even know the names of their passengers except for one.
At 0853 gale warnings were issued for Chesapeake Bay, predicting
30-35 knot winds but Captain Smith did not monitor VHF weather channels
after departing. Smith later stated that he did not consider the EL TORO
to be a small craft anyway. Another vessel in the area first noted
deteriorating conditions around 1200. This vessel was monitoring weather
conditions via cellular phone to a source 20 miles to the northwest. The
use of a cellular phone obviously indicates that this operator was
expecting very bad weather to approach suddenly and wanted to be prepared
to head for home in time. This vessel, upon receiving the bad weather
report, attempted to contact EL TORO by VHF but was unsuccessful.
Although the Coast Guard obviously has interviewed the operator of this
vessel, the report gives no details or names. Why not?
By 1220 it was raining but Smith reports only a light breeze and
"conditions were not adverse." This despite the other vessel reporting at
the same time seas of 6-8' at Smith Point only ten miles due south.
Finally, at 1245 Smith decides to head for home. "While enroute, wind
speed and wave heights increased . . .To maximize passenger comfort, he
operated the vessel at approximately 4.5 knots, half-speed . . . as the
vessel rode over the confused wave pattern at the mouth of the Potomac
River. Wind and waves were predominantly from the northwest."
Here we can see that the vessel is already in trouble because it has to
reduce speed to one-half, thereby at least doubling the amount of time it
will take to return to home port. Why the captain does not seek
closer refuge is never addressed in the report. No mention of the tide is
made as to how its ebb or flow would affect sea conditions vis-a-vie the
Potomac River.
At about 1345 Smith directed the mate to check on passengers and
the engine room bilges. Passengers saw him open the engine room hatch and
express no concern at what he saw. One passenger . . . "saw into the space
and noted liquids in the bilges, four to five inches below the engine
mounts." The mate reported to Captain Smith that all was well. "By this
time seas had built to 5 to 7 feet but the vessel was taking only spray
over the bow." (Note: the report does not attribute direct quotes to any
of the persons interviewed. These quotes are of the report language only.)
Yet the report goes on to say that at around 1355, ten minutes later, Bob
Smith personally went aft and checked the condition of the engine room,
only ten minutes after his mate. Obviously, all is not well. But, by this
time the engine had stopped and Smith was greeted with an engine room full
to the top of the engine with water.
At this point, the vessel is clearly in trouble and the Captain recognized
it as such. A mayday was sent and the passengers directed to don what
turned out to be aging cork life preservers. Carl Smith then organized the
passengers into a bucket brigade and an attempt was made to bail out the
sinking craft. Interestingly, the report says that the buckets were more
effective than the bilge pumps.
By 1406 it is reported that the main deck was awash. By 1430 the
decks were still awash but passengers were complaining that nothing had
been done so far to deploy what apparently is a single house top mounted
life raft. Carl Smith assured passengers that the Coast Guard was coming
soon, despite being advised of a 30 minute ETA. Even the passengers were
smart enough to know that 10, 20, or 30 minutes in fifty degree water
would mean death. Finally, the passengers went up on the house top and
launched the raft themselves. The question here is, what conclusions will
the Coast Guard, which is the author of this information, draw about the
behavior of the Captain and crew?
The Coast Guard report identifies it as a buoyant "apparatus," probably an
appropriate name for one of those wrapped cork beauties with a rope net
bottom, which is what it was. By 1446 all but three passengers and crew
had abandoned ship into the "buoyant apparatus" in 50 degree waters of the
Chesapeake. At this point the report is very vague about what happened
next, but the report does say that three persons were rescued from the
water, outside of the raft. One of these was the 19 year old mate who
later died of exposure. Yet the Captain and his brother managed to get
safely in the raft. The implication here is that the 19 year old
sacrificed his life that another passenger might have a place in the life
raft while the Captain and his brother save themselves. Oddly, no mention
of the mate's heroism is made. Why not? Perhaps because he doesn't hold a
CG license? Would that have helped? Of course the report will make note of
the heroic efforts of their own people and the exposure that they
suffered.
In the meantime, another three persons - all passengers - remained on the
house top (while the owner and his brother got in the raft) which
apparently remained above water and were rescued by a life raft from a
recently arrived Coast Guard vessel.
| "All passengers and crew suffered from hypothermia, being in the
water from 20 to 80 minutes. Many were physically rigid when rescued."
|
| "At 1830, three Coast Guard personnel from UTB41411 were taken to
the hospital for hypothermia. None of the three entered the water
during the rescue." |
Two passengers and the 19 year old crewman ultimately died of exposure
while hospitalized.
With this brief summary of events as extracted from the Coast Guard
report, we can already identify a number of serious problems, but there
are more to come. Not the least of these is the extraordinarily lax
attitudes of party boat owners toward the condition of their vessels and
the safety of their passengers. Just from the language of the report we
can discern questionable behavior of the Captain. How can anyone discount
that 5-7 foot seas are a threat to an aging wooden vessel with passengers
aboard? He was in the vicinity of the mouth of the Potomac and knew of the
dangerous currents. He knew there was bad weather approaching, and he
could have sought nearby shelter in time and yet refused. Gale warnings
were ignored. Another vessel attempted to warn him by radio, but
apparently he wasn't monitoring his radio as the report says he was.
Again, judging by the report, the captain had all available knowledge and
ability to avert the disaster, but did not. Yet the Captain is completely
absolved by the report. Why? Is the writer of the report so arrogant or
stupid that he is not aware that his own writings condemn the Captain?
This willful ignoring of the facts as contained in their own report is
repeated again and again.
Marine surveyors who perform surveys on these craft are no strangers to
such happenings and the terrible conditions aboard these vessels. The
tragedy of the EL TORO points up vividly why we as surveyors ought to be
paying closer attention and applying more rigid standards to these
vessels. As this tragedy so amply demonstrates, surveyors should not
ascribe any significance to the fact that a vessel is U.S.C.G. certified.
In the next section we'll take a look at the actions of one independent
surveyor, the actions of the Coast Guard inspectors, and finally the Coast
Guard report itself. For if the failings of the various parties involved
doesn't convince us of the need for extra caution, the manner in which the
Coast Guard deals with it's investigation will. Remember that Coast Guard
report is, in itself, a conflict of interest. Here we have the certifying
authority of the vessel investigating the loss of the vessel and the
activities of many others that were involved with it. Knowing this, can
there now be any doubt but that the Coast Guard will absolve itself? Read
on. (next)
|